



**International Centre for Criminal Law Reform
and Criminal Justice Policy**

Addressing Inefficiencies in the Criminal Justice Process

Executive Summary

Prepared for the
BC Justice Efficiencies Project
Criminal Justice Reform Secretariat

by
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1. Background

1.1. Introduction - Context and Purpose of this Review

British Columbia has an ongoing commitment to addressing justice inefficiencies and is preparing a proposal for a broad review of inefficiencies in the province's criminal justice system. The British Columbia Justice Efficiencies Project, led by the Criminal Justice Reform Secretariat, is attempting to identify steps which could be taken provincially or at the national level to address perceived justice inefficiencies and to improve the overall performance of the criminal justice process in the province.

At the national level, the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Meeting of Deputy Ministers Responsible for Justice in January of this year, Deputy Ministers agreed that they would review the criminal justice system to identify and address factors that impinge the ability of the Canadian criminal justice system to function efficiently.

The present review is only one part of the Justice Efficiencies Project. Based on local and international consultations as well as a survey of the literature, it attempts to identify promising practices and successful reform initiatives to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice process. Some of the key problems that affect the efficiency of the criminal justice system were identified in a preliminary consultation with local justice officials. These concerns have oriented the present review and focused its search for successful strategies to improve the system's overall efficiency.

The present report offers an overview of some of the key issues involved in improving the efficiency of criminal justice systems and the general approaches used in various jurisdictions to improve that efficiency. A more detailed review of the many reforms contemplated or implemented in Canada and in other jurisdictions will be necessary to assess which reforms may be most appropriate for British Columbia.

1.2. Inefficiencies

There are numerous signs that the criminal justice system is not functioning as efficiently as it should. Lengthy case processing time, for instance, have been a concern (Webster & Doob, 2004). In British Columbia, for example, the number of new criminal cases coming into the court system is decreasing, but the number of court hours is not decreasing at the same rate. The number of appearances per case, the number of days to disposition, and the number of pending cases over 240 days all show an increasing trend.²

Over the last several years, the problem of "system inefficiencies" has been the object of renewed attention in several jurisdictions in Canada and abroad. However, there is

² Source: CORIN database, 2004-05 RCC Data, Provincial Adult Criminal Data.

much less empirical research on this question than one might expect. Many of the core studies that are frequently quoted on the subject are fifteen and twenty years old and, quite frankly, have a fairly narrow empirical basis.

Some of the early efforts at improving the performance of criminal justice systems focused on improving case management, often by betting on the advantages of new communication and data management technologies. New technologies made better case tracking possible even if, at first, new case tracking systems did not always run as smoothly as they were intended to. New tracking systems were particularly weak when they attempted to track cases across different systems or agencies. Nevertheless, some improvements were produced and these information management and communication systems eventually supported the introduction of better and more sophisticated case management processes.

New technologies also strengthened court administration services and allowed some amount of rationalization and greater efficiencies in case scheduling and court time management. In spite of the promises they held, these new technologies only yielded some relatively modest improvements in the overall efficiency of the criminal justice process. Obviously also at play were other systemic factors which were not directly addressed by these technological innovations. Other early reforms to improve the efficiency of the criminal process focussed on distinguishing between cases based on their respective complexity. A number of differential case management practices were thus introduced into the criminal justice process, including the fast tracking of certain cases when appropriate. Again, the system's overall performance was improved, but only slightly. Reformers started to point at other factors, such as the legal culture, the police culture, or the lack of leadership, as matters that needed to be addressed before the criminal justice system's overall performance could be substantially improved.

Most of the promising new developments in the field, many of them as yet untested, come from our evolving knowledge and expertise in the areas of systems, organizational change, change management and organizational behaviour, as opposed to careful experiments within the justice system. One should not be surprised if much of the recent literature on criminal justice efficiency is focusing on concepts of leadership, goal and target setting, strategic planning, change management, performance monitoring and feedback loops, indicators of performance, and accountability.

The question of how to reduce system inefficiencies is getting a new momentum. This is true in Canada, in several provinces and at the national level, as well as in Australia, New Zealand, England, Scotland, Europe, and several jurisdictions in the United States. The Council of Europe, in particular, has established the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPJ) which has taken a systematic approach to the issue and has framed some of the questions outside of the narrow framework of common law

practices. The Commission has attempted to identify some of the best practices relating to criminal proceedings.

Those who have attempted to deal with this complex issue have first had to cope with two practical challenges: (1) defining the issue of “system inefficiency”; (2) measuring its prevalence. British Columbia is no exception.

Defining the issue can be, in itself, quite a challenge. The issue is defined in a number of different ways, all of them revolving around the general theme of the perceived poor performance of the criminal justice system and its growing costs. Poor performance is generally identified by reference to several apparent symptoms of inefficiency such as: unnecessary delays within the process; unnecessary steps in the process (e.g. unnecessary adjournments; procedures mandated by law, policy or tradition which are counter-productive or constitute duplication; unproductive activities (e.g., unproductive court hearings); failed or aborted prosecutions (case withdrawals, dismissed cases, stayed proceedings); “collapsed” or “cracked” trials; and, the exorbitant costs associated with certain types of trials or procedures.

Everyone also recognizes that these symptoms are typically amplified when the system is processing large and complex cases and, as a result, some special attention is now given to the management of these complex cases and mega-trials. For instance, a report was recently prepared by Chief Justice LeSage and Professor Michael Code on large and complex criminal case procedures (Lesage and Code, 2008).

Interruptions in the normal flow of cases are a source of inefficiencies, but they may themselves result from any number of factors. Some often argue that the normal and effective flow of cases is both facilitated and impeded at times by the exercise of **discretionary authority** by various officials. This may suggest that the exercise of such discretionary authority needs to be better circumscribed, guided and monitored.

Some countries, like Austria and Finland, have decided to pay attention to so-called “standstill time” in the flow of cases. They set in place monitoring systems to track instances where a case seems to have remained inactive due to inactivity on the part of the prosecution, the defence or the court (Council of Europe, 2006, 11). A study conducted in Norway for the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice separated case processing time into two major components: action time (time spent when someone is working on the case) and standstill time (time when nothing happens). The findings were “striking”: “While total average action time from the report of the crime to the prosecutorial decision varied between two and five days both between police districts and crime areas, standstill time varied between 43 and 309 days. Action time only constituted a minor part of the total processing time, while standstill time counted for more than 90%” (Smolej and Johnsen, 2006, 4).

Poor **collaboration** or **coordination** among the agencies involved is usually seen as a major source of inefficiency. In every country, the criminal justice “process” refers in fact to the activities of several agencies or institutions (police, prosecutors, judiciary, defence Bar) which, of course, all have their respective priorities, systems, objectives, procedures, and even culture. These various participants in the process all have different ways of approaching the issues of performance and efficiency.

Even if they serve complementary and often interdependent functions, the various components of the justice system must nevertheless operate independently from each other and maintain the integrity of the specific function they perform within the overall system. However, this does not preclude broad initiatives to promote greater coordination and synchronization of complementary processes and activities. In fact, the different components of the system must work together to increase both their respective and collective efficiency. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the main functions of the various components of that system are necessarily defined solely in relation to the criminal justice process. The police’s primary function, for instance, is not to process criminal cases through the courts. In fact, many modern police forces are moving in the opposite direction: finding effective and creative ways to prevent and reduce crime and increase public safety without reference to the justice process. This has obvious implications for any attempt to introduce system-wide performance enhancing measures.

It is often argued that what is needed is to take a **holistic approach** to enhancing the efficiency of the criminal justice process so that real innovation can take place instead of relying on small, isolated and often ineffectual changes. Looking at the experience of various countries, it would seem that the most promising initiatives have been those which have adopted a system-wide approach to reducing inefficiencies, have mobilized the various agencies involved, helped each agency develop and implement performance targets and objectives, and facilitated cooperation among the various agencies through the development of inter-agency cooperation protocols or other means. At the same time, the broad strategies themselves seem to be more effective when they focus on promoting coordination and collaboration at the local level.

At the level of broad **justice principles**, as soon as one raises the question of system efficiency, one can expect to be reminded of the need to improve the system’s efficiency in a manner which does not compromise its effectiveness and its fairness. Efficiency improvement measures must not compromise the effectiveness of the system or the “quality of justice”. It should be possible to identify measures which can improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the system. For example, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPJ) has adopted a new objective for judicial systems, “the processing of each case within optimum and foreseeable timeframes”, but it has also made it clear that its proposed framework for efficiency reforms must be based on three crucial principles:

- (1) the principle of balance and overall quality of the judicial system;

- (2) the need to have efficient measuring and analysis tools defined by stakeholders through consensus; and,
- (3) the need to reconcile the requirements contributing to a fair trial, with a careful balance between procedural safeguards, which necessarily entail the existence of lengths that cannot be reduced, and a concern for prompt justice (Council of Europe, 2006, 4).

The timeliness and efficiency of the criminal justice process need not be opposed to the quality of justice. There are several examples of reforms that have improved both the efficiency and the quality of justice. A gain in efficiency needs not come as a result of a loss in quality. For example, a review of reforms undertaken in nine State criminal trial courts, in the United States, concluded that timeliness in felony case processing occurred in court systems that promoted effective advocacy, an integral component of quality case processing (Ostrom and Hanson, 2000).

There are many ways to look at the efficiency of the criminal justice system. In Canada and elsewhere, there is a frequently expressed public impatience³ with the formal criminal justice process and doubts are often voiced about not only its efficiency, but also its effectiveness in preventing crime and ensuring public safety. In effect, some of the people consulted so far have argued that Canadian society might have reached a crossroad, a point at which choices must be made between competing visions of the purpose of the criminal justice system. This is perhaps nothing new. There probably was never a time when that system was effectively sustained by a single uncontroversial vision. Today, some of the tension apparently stems from opposing visions: one inspired by a desire for peace and public safety and focused on preventing crime, resolving conflicts, and “problem solving” generally, and a more traditional vision based on the affirmation of various legal rights and a reliance on a formal, adversarial adjudicatory process.

At the intersection point between these two competing visions, one finds a number of initiatives to create more efficient “problem solving courts” (Casey, 2005). In the same way that police forces have created some special squads to process certain types of investigations more effectively, or that prosecutions services have allowed the specialization of some prosecutors, some “problem solving courts” have been created to deal with the recurring complexity of certain types of cases and the apparent ineffectiveness of the justice system in addressing their underlying causes (drug courts, family violence courts, etc.).

Since the earliest efforts to improve case management in criminal courts, various schemes have been designed to segregate certain types of cases from others and to respond differentially to them. In the end, nonetheless, the effectiveness and efficiency of each one of these specialized streams must also be assessed.

³ See for example: Kari (2009), Ruby (2008).

The **symptoms** of the system's inefficiency are sometimes obvious, but they are not always easy to interpret. Several of them have been used to quantify the problem and guide reform strategies. They include:

Delays: Some delays are inevitable. Unnecessary delays should therefore be the focused of reform efforts, that is if one can clearly define the difference between necessary and unnecessary delays, or between unavoidable delays and those which can be avoided by better case management, improved procedures, and greater cooperation.

Unnecessary delays are not only a recurring source of inefficiency, but also a source of failed prosecutions and collapsed trials. Furthermore, they can also be an issue from the point of view of the rights of the defendants (affecting their ability to defend themselves) or the victims (Fabri and Langbroek, 2003). In fact, courts and human rights bodies have tried to impose time limits on the criminal trial process and to define the "reasonable time within which a trial must take place" concept found in article 11 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* or in human rights instruments such as the *European Convention on Human Rights* (1950), article 6 (1).

Several jurisdictions have focused their reforms specifically on reducing time delays and identifying avoidable delays (see for example, Criminal Justice Inspection, Northern Ireland, 2006; Weatherburn and Baker, 2000; 2000a). They recognized that the timeliness of case progression through the justice system is an important indicator of effectiveness and efficiency.

The Council of Europe and its members are moving towards a different approach to defining effective case processing. Moving from the concept of "reasonable time" which finds its basis in human rights law, they have adopted the notion of "optimum and foreseeable timeframe" (Council of Europe, 2006, 4). While the former is still recognize as a "lower limit" drawing the line between a violation and non-violation of the law⁴, the latter is defined as an acceptable performance outcome. To prevent delays or reduce timeframes in the justice systems, information must be collected in order to understand where and why delays occur and to provide feedback to those who may be involved in creating unnecessary delays. A study of time management of justice systems in Northern Europe, conducted for the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, described the use and setting of timeframes in courts and a number of management strategies emphasizing court leadership (Smolej and Johnsen, 2006).

Unnecessary adjournments: The number of adjournments in a trial, particularly during the pre-trial period, is often a sign of poor case management (Whittaker et al., 1997). Adjournments, particularly unnecessary ones, have been shown for a long time to be responsible for substantial delays in the criminal justice process (Home Office, 1990) and for creating difficult case scheduling and case management challenges. There may

⁴ Article 6.1 of the *European Convention of Human Rights*.

be numerous reasons for multiple adjournments in a case, including some very valid ones. Determining which adjournments could be avoided is not necessarily easy.

In Australia, a recent study of trial delays showed that more than two thirds of the cases listed for trial were failing to proceed on the designated day (Payne, 2007). Half of these instances were due to either a late guilty plea or a case withdrawal by the prosecution. A detailed analysis found that the delays were most likely the result of inefficient practices than the actual complexity of the cases. The number of adjournments, many of them apparently unnecessary, was a major cause of delays and a significant cost burden on the system.⁵

Ineffective hearings: Ineffective hearings are linked in part to unnecessary adjournments. They often stem from some of the same issues, including poor case preparation, complicated procedures, or the inability of parties to resolve various issues without the intervention of the court.

Length of the criminal trial process: The length of the criminal justice process as a whole is often identified as a sign of the system's overall inefficiency. It is sometimes also argued that a lengthy process is not necessarily a symptom of inefficiency, because that lengthiness may be the normal result of a case's relative complexity. There is a perception among criminal justice professionals that, generally speaking, the complexity of the cases before the courts may be increasing steadily. The total length of the criminal trial process (time to completion) is sometimes used to assess the effectiveness of the criminal justice process. Many jurisdictions, including British Columbia, have observed a steady increase in the average time to completion of cases. That, however, is a very rough measure of the efficiency of the process and many factors may indeed be hiding behind that particular indicator. In fact, the "time to completion" indicator is more appropriately used in conjunction with other measures that can identify which elements of the process may responsible for the lengthy process. Few countries have developed the information management systems that could allow them to properly monitor such indicators on a routine basis.

The Council of Europe (2005) has introduced a time management checklist which consists of a list of indicators to analyse the length of proceedings in the justice system. The checklist enables an analysis of the proceedings on two levels: as the total duration of the proceedings from initial stages to the final decision and as the duration of individual stages of the proceedings (with particular attention devoted to the analysis of the periods of inactivity). The purpose of the checklist is "to reduce undue delays, ensure effectiveness of the proceedings and provide necessary transparency and foreseeability to the users of the justice systems" (Council of Europe, 2005).

Cracked trials, ineffective trials, or collapsed trials: Failed, cracked, or collapsed trials refer to instances where the overall criminal process apparently fails. These

⁵ See also: Government of Australia, 1999.

concepts are not usually well defined and, as such, are not usually adequately captured in existing management information systems.

1.3. Prevalence of the Problem

Countries which have resolved to address the issue of justice system inefficiencies all had to initially confront the problem of lack of baseline data. This, in spite of the fact that many of them had already set in place some fairly sophisticated information management systems. At first, most of these countries did not have readily available data that would allow them to assess the prevalence of the problem or the efficiency of the criminal justice process. Performance indicators had rarely been defined and the necessary monitoring processes had not been developed. To a certain extent, this is the problem that Canada and most of its provinces are currently facing. The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics has developed databases that contain a lot of the relevant data, but the latter has not yet been prepared for the kind of analysis that would be required to produce some baseline data on the nature and prevalence of criminal justice inefficiencies. Several countries have conducted special studies to obtain and analyze that kind of data. They are trying to set in place the necessary monitoring mechanisms to measure any change produced by the reforms they are implementing to address the perceived problem. The Council of Europe, as was mentioned earlier, has developed a comprehensive framework for defining “timeframes” and relevant indicators as well as a time management checklist for justice systems (Council of Europe, 2005). In British Columbia, the process of developing and implementing the necessary performance indicators is just beginning. It will be quite some time before reliable baseline data are available on the justice system’s inefficiencies.

In British Columbia, a more comprehensive review of the available data on the relative efficiency of the criminal justice process is necessary and is currently underway as part of the present project.

1.4. Solutions - Performance Enhancement Measures

Part of the challenge is to better understand how systems reproduce themselves and adapt to change and how different attempts to improve the system’s performance can be expected to evolve over time. We know very little about how to influence complex systems, particularly when we are dealing with self-organizing yet highly regulated systems interacting with each other in complex and evolving ways.

One method consists of looking at weak points within the system, points which appear to be responsible for delays and inefficiencies. Some of the most useful work conducted to date seems to suggest that a fruitful analysis of such a complex process is often yielded by an examination of points in the process where actors are confronted with **uncertainty** or **unpredictability** about the process or its outcomes.

We may want to look for efficiencies at the points of “confluence” or “weak congruence” between different components of the justice system or parts of the criminal process: where information is not properly transferred from one part of the system to another; where uncertainties are responsible for delays; where discretionary powers make the system less predictable; where tensions exist between competing objectives; where cooperation between agencies and individuals is most critical; and, points at which the process has a regular tendency to become disjointed or disarticulated.

These problematic points are found at those moments when the normal flow of the process is interrupted, slowed down, or side-tracked. The Council of Europe (2006), for example, has recommended that “standstill times”, times at which the process is inactive, should be identified.

A cursory analysis of the criminal justice process is sufficient to understand that these weak points, or points of non-confluence, are typically found where:

1. the functions and activities of two or more agencies intersect within the criminal process without the necessary rules, protocols and leadership to support congruent action and effective cooperation;
2. the exercise of discretion by one or more participants is introducing an element of unpredictability in terms of the outcome of a particular decision or its implication for the remainder of the process;
3. the non-congruence between the objectives pursued by different participants and/or agencies manifests itself, leading to misunderstandings, poor cooperation, unpredictable decisions, unproductive frictions, and divergent activities;
4. the fundamental opposition between the goals of two main parties involved (e.g., the defence and the prosecution) engages them in antithetical or adversative actions that are not or cannot be (e.g. to preserve the overall fairness and integrity of the process) resolved efficiently or expeditiously;
5. the non-performance or ineffective performance of a particular activity or function by one of the interdependent components of the process interrupts the process flow and disrupts the activities of the other components;
6. deliberate actions or inactions by one or more of the components of the process (or even external actors) derails or slows down the process; or,
7. an interruption in the process flow is caused by an external element (a temporary lack of facilities or an physical interruption of communication) or by actors or events outside of the process itself.

So far, many if not most initiatives to reduce inefficiencies in the criminal justice process have focused mainly on addressing the main symptoms of the problem. They have attempted to reduce the number of adjournments and undue delays, the number of

failed prosecutions, the number of “cracked”, “collapsed” or “ineffective” trials, or the overall length of the process and their consequential costs. These are of course all valid goals for justice reform, but they do not provide a comprehensive framework for improving the performance of the system as a whole or even for understanding the reasons behind its current inefficiency. Focusing on **uncertainties** and **points of non-confluence** within that system in order to identify some of the main systemic factors behind the perceived inefficiencies in the criminal justice process may lead to a pragmatic system-wide approach for improving the system’s performance.

With respect to “ineffective trials” and collapsed or “cracked” trials, one can identify a number of specific **uncertainties** in the typical trial process which tend to affect its efficiency or even its success. A comprehensive study of criminal trial delays in Australia by the Australian Institute of Criminology has shown the role of these uncertainties as important contributors to trial adjournments or collapses (Payne, 2007).

The uncertainties in question included:

- Uncertainty about timing and the general time lines within which the process and its various components are expected to take place. This includes uncertainties resulting from court administration, rules of the court, scheduling and the effectiveness of the planning and communication technology supporting it, availability of judges, availability of courtrooms and courtroom hours available; and limited judicial and court resources.
- Uncertainties affecting the pre-trial process, including uncertainties about the plea bargaining process, the disclosure and preliminary hearing processes.
- Uncertainties about exactly when a trial is expected to proceed due to the number of adjournments, including unnecessary adjournments and ineffective hearings, which introduce problematic and unproductive delays within the process, or due to certain practices such as over-listing of cases.
- Uncertainties related to the prosecution function, including those caused by counterproductive practices and procedures within the charging process.
- Uncertainties related to the defence function and the availability of legal aid services or funding.

There may often be some very practical reasons why a trial cannot proceed as scheduled. Not all delays can be avoided. The lack of resources often puts a strain on the process (Payne, 2007, 70). The prosecutor and the defence counsel must manage multiple cases at a single time; evidence may not become available until late in the process due to backlog in processing certain type of forensic evidence; funding for legal assistance may not always allow for early preparation and effective interactions between the prosecution and the defence.

Some inefficiency may be attributable to the system's lack of resources. Yet, other uncertainties and inefficiencies appear to be entirely preventable by a more effective use of existing resources and a rationalization of existing procedure.

A limited court capacity or an unexpected reduction in capacity can affect scheduling and case management and create various uncertainties about whether or when a case will proceed. This, in turn, may affect several other factors and result in further delays, a backlog of cases, and other problems. Some courts are attempting to respond to the problem of lack of capacity by over-listing cases, a practice which tends to create further uncertainties about whether a case will proceed as planned and to dissuade the parties from preparing adequately for the hearing. Unnecessary adjournments and unproductive hearings often result from this practice.

The capacity of the courts is often the best statistical predictor of how many cases are heard within the system. Evidently, the system adjusts itself to itself and cases that cannot be processed within the limited capacity of the courts are either postponed to become part of a growing backlog of cases or are otherwise resolved, not necessarily in ways which enhance the credibility and the fairness of the system.

The length of time within which a case can be expected to be processed is hard to estimate or predict. It varies considerably depending on the nature and complexity of the case. Most systems do not have guidelines or targets to guide the participants in the process and to suggest a normal or optimal length of time within which that process ought to be completed. A relatively new strategy for addressing delays consists of setting targets and monitoring whether they are met.

Some of the critical factors in reducing delays and other inefficiencies in the criminal process were listed in a report prepared for the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (Fabri and Langbroek, 2003). They included: definition of goals and standards; judicial commitment, leadership and adequate accountability mechanisms; involvement of the different actors in the system; effective court supervision of case progress; the implementation of effective case management systems; case monitoring; and, education and training.

Many reformers have noted the need to bring about change in the legal culture in order to facilitate effective reforms (Government of Australia, 1999, 70; Raine and Wilson, 1993). The courts' working environment can promote or inhibit timeliness and effective advocacy. The expectations of lawyers and judges about how long it will take for cases to be resolved have "profound effects on how long cases actually take to resolve" (Ostrom and Hanson, 2000, 10).

A study of the organizational culture in eight U.K. magistrates' courts showed that it could influence the scheduling of cases (Raine and Willson, 1993). Based on interviews, observation and case records, the study showed that the organizational

culture of each court had a real impact on scheduling performance, particularly on the level of delay and collapsed trials. When they engaged in strategic negotiations with professional users, the courts used their time more efficiently, heard more trials in full, and disposed of more trial cases on the day they were listed.

In order to counter the debilitating resistance that reform efforts can encounter, it is important for a reform initiative to: (1) clearly define some concrete goals and standards; (2) delineate the respective responsibilities of each group of participants in implementing the reforms; (3) set in place adequate accountability mechanisms; and, (4) provide feedback to participants on the change that are being effected.

1.5. The Structure of this Report

This following parts of this report will summarize some recent initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the criminal justice process. It looks first at initiatives to improve court administration practices and case flow management, including initiatives that have relied in whole or in part on the introduction of new technologies. It also considers initiatives which have focused on improving the criminal investigation process and the communication between the police and the prosecutors. It then examines briefly some initiatives aimed at increasing the role of summary proceedings within the system and at encouraging the use of diversion and an early disposition of cases.

The bulk of the reform experiences reviewed in preparing this report did focus on the pre-trial process, including the disclosure process, and that explains why the report gives a fair amount of attention to these efforts and their apparent impact. Finally, the report refers to recent attempts to improve the attendance of witnesses and victims since their non-attendance has been revealed, in most countries, as a major source of inefficiency.

Finally, because it becomes quickly obvious that most reform attempts have suffered from a lack of reliable data on the justice system's performance, the report has a last short section on the role and importance of performance indicators.